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SUMMARY 
“The safest place in the world for a terrorist to be is inside the United States. . . . As long as 
terrorists don’t do something that trips them up against our laws, they can do pretty much all they 
want.” 
        Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor1 
 
Several paradigms were altered on 9/11. The U.S. intelligence community, largely focused 
on state actors, now faced the threat posed by elusive terrorists. The community also had to 
address the asymmetry posed by the terrorists’ use of unconventional and relatively 
unsophisticated methods to create loss of life and damage – a more complex intelligence 
task. Lastly, due to terrorist disregard for national borders, laws, and transnational 
financing, the United States had to change its concept of foreign versus domestic 
intelligence.2 
The area of domestic intelligence raises several issues. First, law enforcement and 
intelligence operate in different worlds – one seeks to prosecute, the other to gather 
information.3 Second, with the development of multiple state fusion centers and the 
creation of additional organizations focused on intelligence, there is a corresponding 
increase in bureaucratization. This adds to the challenge of sharing information. Lastly and 
perhaps most importantly, there are issues concerning the protection of civil liberties and 
effective oversight. 
The challenge in developing a viable domestic intelligence capability for the United 
States centers on how to organize these capabilities optimally within the larger U.S. 
intelligence framework, how to ensure streamlined information sharing between foreign 
intelligence and the multitude of law enforcement agencies, and how best to implement 
oversight mechanisms to protect civil liberties and ensure accountability of intelligence 
operations. Organizational mechanisms, information sharing, and oversight are the three 
critical components to instituting an effective domestic intelligence capability. 
One of the proposed constructs to meet these organizational and information sharing 
challenges is to create a domestic intelligence agency. The United States is unique among 
Western or highly industrialized countries in that it does not possess one. This paper 
examines the feasibility, suitability, and acceptability of instituting a domestic intelligence 
agency in the United States from the viewpoint of organization, information sharing, and 
oversight. It will assess the domestic intelligence organizations of three countries that 
possess liberal democratic institutions – the United Kingdom’s Military Intelligence 5 
(MI5), the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), and India’s Intelligence 
Bureau (IB) – to determine their relative effectiveness in countering terrorism, identify 
their strengths and shortfalls, and determine applicable policy recommendations for the 
United States. 
Specific criteria are used to establish a measure of assessment for a domestic intelligence 
agency. In this case, the criteria are derived from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic 
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Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), which partners with countries to promote governance 
and determine recommendations that promote government reform. Examples of some 
criteria are the subordination of intelligence to national laws, effective coordination, and 
oversight. 
Examining countries with similar democratic institutions, threats, and (in the case of 
Australia and India) geographic scope will result in identifying key factors for instituting an 
effective domestic intelligence capability for the United States. This examination will also 
determine whether current intelligence reform policies are targeting perceived intelligence 
shortfalls and offer additional recommendations. It will also determine whether the 
establishment of a domestic intelligence agency is feasible, acceptable, and suitable to 
meeting the asymmetric threats of the 21st Century. 
INTRODUCTION 
Al Qaeda conducted a devastating strike on 9/11 by using airliners as weapon of mass 
destruction (WMD). In terms of scale, they incurred a relatively small cost to create billions 
of dollars worth of damage.4 The psychological impact was also devastating and prompted a 
massive response and reorganization of the U.S. government to combat this threat.5 Part of 
this reorganization was a close examination of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI). A Congressional inquiry into 9/11 revealed several FBI shortcomings: 
• “The FBI’s decentralized structure and inadequate information technology made the 
Bureau unable to correlate the knowledge possessed by its components. The FBI did 
not gather intelligence from all its many cases nation-wide to produce an overall 
assessment of al Qaeda’s presence in the United States.” 
• “Many FBI field offices had not made counterterrorism a top priority and they knew 
little about al Qaeda before September 11.” 
• The FBI also did not inform policymakers of the extent of terrorist activity in the 
United States. “Although the FBI conducted many investigations, these pieces were 
not fitted into a larger picture.”6 
These findings highlighted a domestic intelligence gap and, as a result, have led to 
several larger governmental initiatives and internal FBI reforms. Another 
organizational alternative is to create a domestic intelligence agency to focus solely on 
domestic intelligence and collection. Supporters of a domestic intelligence agency have 
proposed this alternative as the best method to effectively address the domestic 
intelligence gap. In attempting to address this gap, however, there are additional 
issues. First, there are opposing viewpoints as to whether the domestic intelligence 
apparatus should remain within and tied to the FBI versus establishing it as an 
independent entity. Second, the creation of another bureaucracy raises concerns about 
the effectiveness of information sharing. Third, an increased focus on domestic 
intelligence leads to concerns about civil liberties and oversight. Examining the 
domestic intelligence structures of the United Kingdom, Australia, and India in terms 
of these three issues can assist in determining the applicability of those structures and 
offer implementation considerations for the United States. 
Advocates for a separate domestic intelligence agency point to several advantages. 
The first is a symbolic one: the creation of such an agency would emphasize the 
government’s commitment to preventing another catastrophic attack.7 As Mark 
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Lowenthal states, “several issues spill over into the domestic realm – economics, 
narcotics, crime, and terrorism – thus curtailing the activities of much of the 
intelligence community . . .”8 A domestic intelligence agency would also focus directly 
on these domestic-foreign terrorism nexus’ issues and afford greater precision to 
developing and categorizing the domestic threat. Creating an agency strictly focused on 
this mission could more directly address the domestic intelligence gap as compared to 
the higher organizational and bureaucratic changes that have been implemented since 
9/11. 
Second, there is inherent competition between law enforcement and intelligence for 
resources and focus. Harry Ransom highlighted this competitive tension when referring 
to CIA intelligence and operations: “The ill advised marriage of intelligence collection-
analysis-estimates with covert action has further complicated role theory.”9 Advocates 
for a domestic intelligence agency argue that the FBI’s intelligence function will always 
take a secondary role to its law enforcement responsibilities due to the focus on 
“making cases” and the preponderance of the FBI’s leadership coming from law 
enforcement.10 Combining two missions that operate in different worlds and possess 
different challenges under one organization contributes to operational ineffectiveness. 
Lastly, it is much easier to recruit, perform undercover work, and take advantage of 
the loyal Muslim base in the United States.11 As one FBI official noted before a 
Congressional inquiry, “foreign governments often knew more about radical Islamist 
activity in the United States than did the U.S. Government because they saw this activity as 
a threat to their own existence.”12 The development of a domestic intelligence baseline to 
categorize the terrorist threat in terms of cells, planning efforts, and underlying support 
networks would directly support investigatory efforts. For the advocates, a renewed focus 
by a domestic intelligence agency dedicated to developing these intelligence resources in 
the United States would directly support prevention efforts. 
Despite the advantages, there is also considerable opposition. Opponents counter that 
the addition of another organization adds another layer of bureaucracy, making it harder to 
overcome the already obscured relationship between law enforcement and intelligence.13 
Creating another agency, while having the merit of focusing on intelligence issues, does not 
address the larger problem of information sharing outside of its organization.14 As Eric 
Taylor states, “added bureaucracies will only cause agile terrorist groups glee as they 
outmaneuver sluggish government attempts to counter them.”15 
There is also the potential abuse of civil liberties and danger of politicization. U.S. 
intelligence agencies historically have had limited roles in internal security.16 Letting an 
organization pursue an aggressive domestic intelligence agenda could lead to the 
domestic spying abuses similar to those of the 1950s and 1960s.17 The potential for such 
abuse will also increase the scrutiny of the executive branch, which could lead to a 
backlash similar to the Church and Pike Commission recommendations.18 There is also 
the danger of politicization. As Ransom asserts, “. . . politicization is inherent in the 
production of intelligence because information is crucial to gaining and preserving political 
power.”19 A domestic intelligence agency has the unique potential of becoming politicized. 
As Ransom further states, the CIA was insulated from partisan politics from 1947 to 1967 
because, “a foreign policy consensus prevailed, secrecy normally expected by an intelligence 
agency was maintained and congressional knowledge and monitoring of intelligence 
operations was very limited.”20 Those sets of circumstances do not exist today. 
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The arguments for developing a domestic intelligence agency center on its prevention 
activities, the organization’s unity of purpose, and the recruitment of intelligence sources. 
The reasons for not implementing are the additional layers of bureaucracy that do not 
facilitate information sharing, the potential abuse of civil rights, and the danger of 
politicization. The challenge and key task is to determine how to organize domestic 
intelligence efforts, how to facilitate information sharing, and how to protect against 
potential abuses in the U.S. 
Democracies, by their nature, are faced with a conflicting dilemma regarding 
terrorism. As Benjamin Netanyahu, the former Prime Minister of Israel, states: 
The governments of free societies charged with fighting a rising tide of 
terrorism are thus faced with a democratic dilemma: If they do not fight 
terrorism with the means available to them, they endanger their citizenry; if 
they do, they appear to endanger the very freedoms which they are charged to 
protect.21 
This dilemma lies at the center of the public debate. Richard A. Posner, a noted jurist, 
identifies two issues. The first is where to draw the line between security and liberty; 
the second is which controls are necessary to prevent any law enforcement or 
intelligence agency from crossing the line leading to potential civil rights abuses.22 As 
Posner further notes, public safety and personal liberty are both constitutional values. 
The challenge is to devise a system that balances law enforcement and intelligence 
equities, allows for information sharing, and ensures effective oversight and 
accountability of intelligence activities. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control 
of Armed Forces (DCAF) offers some benchmarks: 
• Domestic intelligence and collection are subject to national laws. 
• The separation of foreign versus domestic intelligence requires an effective 
coordination of collection. 
• Coordination is performed by an executive branch entity. 
• Joint assessments are ideally undertaken by an independent body. 
• Executive, legislative, and judicial branches exercise oversight.23 
Examining the United Kingdom’s Military Intelligence 5 (MI5), the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), and the Indian Intelligence Bureau (IB) in terms of 
these benchmarks can offer ideas and insight into implementation challenges for 
improving homeland security intelligence in the United States. Each of the countries is 
similar in that they possess democratic institutions. Australia and India are more 
similar to the United States in that both possess a federalist type structure with the 
sharing of power between the federal government and state or provincial institutions. 
This distinction is considerably less in the United Kingdom. Additionally, India – the 
world’s largest democracy – can be compared more readily with the United States in 
terms of the scope of domestic intelligence challenges. Other specific intelligence 
similarities and challenges include: 
• The refocus of the British, Australian, and Indian intelligence on transnational 
terrorism and internal security issues since 9/11. 
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• The reorganization of the British, Australian, and Indian intelligence 
communities through creation of special task forces and assessment bodies 
focused on terrorism. 
• The passage of strong anti-terror legislation and the subsequent debate over 
internal security and civil liberties. 
There are, however, significant differences. The United Kingdom, Australia, and India 
possess parliamentary systems where the power of the executive is divided between the 
head of state and head of government. The head of government, in this case the Prime 
Minister, is also reliant on the support of the legislative branch or parliament. This 
support is expressed through a vote of confidence or no confidence. The distinction and 
separation between the executive and legislative branches of government is much 
clearer in the United States. Other differences also include the wide differences in 
language and culture within India versus the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Australia. The ethnic differences in India have resulted in significant and recurring 
sectarian violence since its independence in 1947. The United Kingdom has also faced a 
similar issue with regard to the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Simply put, a 
relationship exists between countries with significant internal stability problems and 
the nature of the oversight mechanisms they possess. Specific differences include: 
• The United Kingdom is much smaller geographically than the United States. 
Additionally, the United Kingdom and Australia are island nations with lesser 
border control and security issues as compared to the scale and scope of the 
United States or India. 
• Indian geography – its scale and proximity to terrorist safe havens in 
Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and the Kashmir – coupled with its much larger 
population and significant Muslim minority leads to greater internal security 
issues beyond the scale of the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States. 
Considering the similarities and differences, there is value in assessing the 
effectiveness of the United Kingdom’s MI5, Australia’s ASIO, and India’s IB. The 
applicability of their practices will be assessed by using the DCAF’s benchmarks and 
utilizing the following criteria: 
• Feasible: Task can be accomplished with forces and resources. 
• Suitable: Will mission be accomplished if tasks are carried out successfully? 
• Acceptable: Results are politically supportable.24 
 
 
THE UNITED KINGDOM’S SECURITY SERVICE BRANCH – MILITARY 
INTELLIGENCE 5 (MI5) 
 
“We're always trying to improve our intelligence gathering but these groups operate in an 
immensely secretive way, it is very, very difficult often to track down exactly what they're 
doing . . .”25 
- Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 
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Organization. The MI5, also known as the Security Service, is the United Kingdom’s 
domestic intelligence agency. It is responsible for responding to a wide range of 
security threats that include terrorism, counterintelligence, weapons of mass 
destruction, and organized crimes. MI5 falls under the Home Ministry, which has no 
precise U.S. equivalent.26 The Security Service is one of three tier-one intelligence 
organizations. The Secret Intelligence Service, or MI6, focuses on foreign intelligence 
and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) is responsible for 
communications intercept and code breaking efforts.27 
MI5 is chartered to conduct domestic surveillance operations against a wide variety 
of targets, but it does not possess independent arrest powers.28 The philosophy behind 
this organizational relationship is to force MI5 to work hand-in-hand the various fifty-
six police forces in the United Kingdom, particularly the Metropolitan and provincial 
Special Branches (SB).29 As Peter Chalk states, “The Special Branch structure is the 
primary instrument through which intelligence is translated into operational activity 
and prosecutions.”30 
Despite the terrorist attacks in London (2005), the MI5 can point to credible 
successes. The former Director of MI5, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller has stated that 
MI5 is tracking approximately 200 radical groups and over 1,600 individuals who are 
actively supporting or linked to terrorist activities focused on the United Kingdom – 
whether domestically or in foreign areas.31 Given MI5’s size, the scope of these numbers 
would suggest a high degree of coordination, precision, and fidelity between Britain’s 
foreign intelligence community, its assessment bodies, and law enforcement entities.32 
Strategic Outlook. The United Kingdom has a history of combating terrorists, 
particularly in its long struggle against the IRA. As a result, MI5 has an established 
tradition of conducting domestic intelligence operations to include electronic 
surveillance, recruitment, and infiltration of terrorist groups. It also has a well 
established working relationship with law enforcement. 
The events of 9/11 fundamentally shifted the focus of the United Kingdom’s 
intelligence apparatus. Islamic terrorism is now identified as the number one threat.33 
MI5’s intelligence functions are part of a greater government counter-terrorism 
strategy known as CONTEST. The overarching aim of this strategy is to reduce the risk 
of terrorism through pursuit of four strategic approaches or lines of operation: prevent, 
pursue, protect, and prepare.34 Intelligence gathering and disrupting terrorist activities 
are identified as two integral components under pursuit activities. MI5 performs a 
unique service to support these two lines of operation.35 
Information Sharing. MI5 serves as an assessment agency as well as a collection 
entity. Its analysis directly supports the United Kingdom’s Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC), which serves as the government’s focal point for intelligence 
prioritization and assessment.36 The JIC also provides regular assessments to ministers 
and other senior officials.37 The establishment of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre 
(JTAC) in June 2003 (under the supervision of MI5) brings analysts from the 
respective intelligence agencies under one umbrella to facilitate the sharing of 
intelligence and breaking down of cross-agency barriers.38 Underneath the JTAC 
structure, the various Special Branches have pooled their resources to develop Regional 
Intelligence Cells that share responsibilities and support further information sharing.39 
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Although the United Kingdom has a highly evolved intelligence structure with a long 
tradition of conducting domestic intelligence, there have been several instances of 
information-sharing shortfalls. MI5 has been criticized for not providing warning of the 
Bali attacks in October 2002, the Mombasa attack in November 2002, and failing to 
pass specific intelligence regarding the shoe bomber, Richard Reid.40 
The development of a strategic intelligence architecture and information sharing 
policies is a relevant issue for the United States. Information sharing remains a 
problematic issue despite the United Kingdom’s well established intelligence 
mechanisms, clearly defined missions and roles, and assessment organs. An 
examination of the U.S. intelligence architecture and information sharing practices – a 
key 9/11 shortfall – is critical and uniquely relevant particularly given the numerous 
changes, reorganizations, and reforms within the U.S. intelligence community. An 
assessment of these changes is necessary particularly as the events of 9/11 move further 
into the past. 
Oversight. The authority of Britain’s Cabinet structure from a majority in the House 
of Commons affords the Prime Minister greater latitude on national security and 
intelligence matters.41 Although the Security Service Act of 1989 codified MI5’s rules, 
missions, and functions, the intelligence and security services were largely exempt from 
the scrutiny of Parliament and the public until the passing of the Intelligence Services 
Act of 1994.42 As a result of this legislation, Parliament’s Intelligence and Security 
Committee (ISC) now reviews the budget, administration, and policy of all three 
intelligence agencies.43 Its legislative oversight function, however, is much more 
limited that the U.S. congressional committee system.44 
Executive oversight is also exercised by the ISC, which consists of nine members of 
parliament from various political parties. The ISC reports directly to the Prime 
Minister and is charged with producing an annual report on intelligence activities.45 
This committee operates within Britain’s “ring of secrecy,” which is bounded by the 
Official Secrets Act.46 The Official Secrets Act allows the British government to 
exercise, in effect, prior restraint with respect to any disclosure of information that can 
be deemed harmful to the national interest.47 Although the ISC is chartered with 
exercising oversight, its members are appointed by and answer directly to the Prime 
Minister – creating the potential for a conflict of interest. Additionally, despite the 
oversight mechanisms, MI5 continues to remain essentially a self-tasking organization 
requiring no separate approval before initiating a new operation.48 There have also 
been instances of politicization, particularly during the 1980s when MI5 conducted 
counter-subversive operations against leftwing politicians and organizations who Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher termed, “the Enemy Within.”49 
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Figure 1. DCAF Benchmarks versus the U.K. 
 
Conclusion. MI5’s strengths lie in its ability to operate under a well defined executive 
structure that utilizes an independent intelligence assessment umbrella and operates 
under a well understood set of laws. The organization also has a long history of 
performing its internal security and domestic intelligence functions. The United 
Kingdom also possesses several highly evolved mechanisms to coordinate the sharing 
of intelligence. Despite this structure, there have been several instances where MI5 did 
not share its intelligence. Effective intelligence sharing remains an issue. Although 
there are existing oversight mechanisms, the structure of the United Kingdom’s 
oversight organs also inhibits significant legislative oversight of the intelligence 
process. Utilizing the DCAF benchmarks listed in Figure 1, the United Kingdom’s 
strengths lie in its strong executive coordination and independent assessment process. 
Its domestic intelligence agency also operates under a well defined set of national laws, 
although the effectiveness of information sharing remains an issue. Lastly, given the 
United Kingdom’s oversight structure and MI5’s past abuses, the oversight and 
accountability mechanisms that balance civil liberties versus public safety remain a 
potential area of concern. An assessment of information-sharing practices and 
oversight procedures – given the numerous changes within the U.S. intelligence 
community and the recent FBI controversy on the handling and accountability of 
National Security Letters – is of particular relevance for the United States. 
 
THE AUSTRALIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION (ASIO) 
 
“In the difficult fight against the new menace of international terrorism, there is nothing 
more crucial than timely and accurate intelligence.”50 
John Howard, Australian Prime Minister 
Organization: The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) serves as 
Australia’s domestic intelligence organization. Similar to MI5, it is chartered to address 
a wide variety of threats.51 ASIO works closely with the Australian Protective Service 
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(APS), with both agencies falling under Australia’s Attorney General.52 ASIO is also one 
of three tier-one intelligence organizations. The Australian Secret Intelligence Service 
(ASIS) functions as the foreign intelligence entity while the Defence Signals Directorate 
(DSD) is focused on signals intelligence.53 
Heavily influenced by the British philosophy of separating domestic intelligence and 
law enforcement powers, ASIO does not have independent arrest powers.54 As such, 
ASIO must work closely with police entities particularly the APS – roughly equivalent 
to the FBI or the Royal Canadian Mountain Police (RCMP). The primary venue for APS-
ASIO interaction is through the National Threat Assessment Centre, which serves as 
the focal point for collaboration with federal organization and state police forces.55 
Strategic Outlook. Australia does not have a long history of combating terrorists. It 
has not been plagued by an internal threat (like the United Kingdom and the IRA) or 
India’s numerous internal security issues due to its linguistic and ethnic differences. 
Additionally, Australia has been largely isolated by the nature of its geography. As a 
whole, Australia has typically viewed its strategic threats in a foreign context and has 
prized the value of international cooperation with its allies to deal with its security 
issues.  
Despite its lack of internal threats, the Australian government has taken a serious 
and very thorough approach to internal security. It went through significant security 
preparations for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, which also highlighted the value of 
international cooperation.56 The Australian government now recognizes Islamic 
terrorism as its highest threat priority and has committed significant resources to 
counterterrorism as a result of the 9/11 attacks and al Qaeda statements that identify 
Australia as a target.57 ASIO’s intelligence function operates as part of the government’s 
four pronged counterterrorism approach: prevention, preparedness, response, and 
recovery. Improving intelligence capacity, increasing the effectiveness of information 
sharing, seeking better detection capabilities, and improving law enforcement 
coordination are the overarching themes under prevention and preparedness.58 
Despite the lack of a historical internal security threat or Australia’s priority as a 
target for a terrorist attack, the ASIO can point to some success in categorizing and 
tracking domestic terrorist threats. Similar to the MI5, ASIO also has the reputation for 
thoroughness and developing precise intelligence. On November 18, 2005, Australian 
authorities foiled the activities of two terrorist cells. ASIO and Australian law 
enforcement agencies were able to prevent an attack possibly aimed at critical 
infrastructure as a result of an eighteen-month long investigation into individuals with 
possible linkages to al Qaeda and radical Kashmiri groups.59 
Information Sharing. Like MI5, ASIO also serves as an analytic assessment agency. 
The Office of National Assessment (ONA) serves as Australia’s premier strategic 
assessment organization. ONA, ASIO, ASIS, and DSD also enjoy close access to the 
Prime Minister’s Office.60 The National Intelligence Group (NIG), which resides under 
ASIO, collates intelligence from multiple sources and disseminates products to 
governmental and law enforcement officials through Joint Intelligence Groups.61 
Executive coordination of domestic intelligence and other matters is accomplished 
through the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) and the Secretaries’ 
Committee on National Security (SCoNS). The NSC consists of senior policy makers 
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while the SCoNS consists of department secretaries who, like those in the United 
Kingdom, are professional bureaucrats.62 
Although Australia’s intelligence system is modeled on the United Kingdom’s, with 
domestic intelligence having to work closely with law enforcement entities, there have 
also been corresponding shortfalls in information sharing. ASIO’s performance was 
also criticized for disregarding threat assessments from regional analysts regarding the 
Bali attack in 2002 – an area directly under ASIO’s concern.63 Like the United 
Kingdom, Australia has a highly defined intelligence community; however, its track 
record on information sharing is an issue. Despite Australian and British similarities 
and the ability of their domestic intelligence agencies to possibly develop greater 
precision in categorizing the domestic threat, their identified information sharing 
problems remain a relevant issue for the United States. 
Oversight. ASIO’s statutory responsibilities are outlined in the ASIO Act of 1979. 
Although Australia is similar to the United Kingdom, there is a greater distinction 
between executive and legislative oversight roles. The Intelligence Services Act of 2001 
expanded the role of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security in 
overseeing Australia’s intelligence apparatus.64 The committee can initiate 
investigations or respond to requests from the Attorney General requests.65 Australia’s 
executive oversight is also more robust. The Inspector General of Intelligence and 
Security (IGIS) is an independent officer appointed by the Governor-General and 
located within the Prime Minister’s office. This unique arrangement allows the IGIS to 
assist the government and parliament in oversight matters, but allows the office to act 
independently. The IGIS also enjoys total access to all intelligence and possesses the 
power of independent inquiry.66 This oversight also includes access to case files, 
warrant powers, and financial records. 
Although not a method of oversight, the Australian government also has an 
aggressive public outreach program. The federal government has established National 
Security Public Information Guidelines for all agencies engaged in national security 
issues to promote the public’s understanding of the missions and threat. A National 
Security Public Information Campaign also seeks to encourage public vigilance. 
Security information is pushed via a variety of media means to inform the Australian 
public of the government’s efforts against terrorism and to create a safer 
environment.67 These efforts directly support ASIO’s efforts in engaging communities 
to derive community-based information conduits to support its assessments. This is in 
stark contrast to MI5’s historical outlook regarding public engagement, which took the 
major step of instituting a public website only after 9/11.68 Despite these strong 
oversight mechanisms, ASIO has also been criticized for heavy-handed and intrusive 
tactics in the past against leftwing groups.69 
 
 
BURCH, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 





Figure 2. DCAF Benchmarks versus the U.K.-Australia 
 
CONCLUSION. ASIO’s strength, like MI5, lies in its ability to operate under a well 
defined structure and an independent assessment umbrella. ASIO also has a long 
history in internal security and domestic intelligence. Despite possessing a highly 
evolved information sharing structure, there have also been corresponding shortfalls in 
ASIO’s information sharing performance. Lastly, Australia has robust executive and 
legislative oversight mechanisms, which although not possessing a perfect track record, 
are effective in overseeing the country’s intelligence process. An examination of 
Australian oversight mechanisms and public outreach programs may offer some areas 
for improvement in the United States. When compared against the DCAF benchmarks 
in Figure 2, Australia’s top strengths lie in its strong laws governing domestic 
intelligence, the ability of the executive body to coordinate intelligence, and its 
independent assessment capability. Similar to the United Kingdom, it also has faced 
some information sharing shortfalls and although it possesses a better defined 
executive and legislative oversight process, there have been instances of past abuse. 
 
THE INDIAN INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (IB) 
“We are fully on board as far as the global war against terror is concerned. We will cooperate 
with everybody, bilaterally, regionally, at the global level, in the fight against terror.”70 
 Manmoham Singh, Prime Minister of India 
 
Organization. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) functions as India’s internal security 
agency.71 One of the longest functioning intelligence agencies, its roots can be traced 
back to the Imperial Intelligence Bureau, which served British interests in India.72 It is 
chartered with a wide range of responsibilities spanning from combating terrorists and 
the separatist efforts of Naxalists (Indian Maoists) to critical infrastructure protection 
– particularly aviation security.73 The IB falls under India’s Ministry of Home Affairs 
although the Director of the IB can report to the Prime Minister on intelligence 
issues.74 Unlike the United Kingdom and Australia, which possess separate foreign 
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espionage and signals intelligence organizations, India’s Research and Analysis Wing 
(RAW) oversees all of India’s foreign intelligence.75 Similar to MI5 and ASIO, the IB 
does not have independent arrest powers and must rely on federal and state law 
enforcement elements. 
India has been hard pressed to reform its intelligence apparatus. Following the 
eleven-week skirmish in 1999 with Pakistan, the Group of Ministers (GoM) initiated a 
major study of India’s security and intelligence. This study, headed by former RAW 
director, Girish Saxena, submitted numerous recommendations to streamline the 
intelligence process.76 The Saxena Committee performed the first major review of 
Indian national security and intelligence since its independence in 1947.77 For the IB, 
these initiatives included the development of an independent signals intelligence 
capability, an expansion of the IB’s field presence by bolstering its Subsidiary 
Intelligence Bureaus (SIB) at the state level, implementation of Inter-State Intelligence 
Support Teams, development of Joint Task Forces for Intelligence (JTFIs), and a Multi 
Agency Centre (MAC) to electronically collate and database related intelligence.78 
Despite its promise, most of the reforms have not been implemented – largely due to 
bureaucratic infighting. The Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Finance have 
disapproved the key elements recommended by the committee.79 The development of 
the IB’s signals intelligence capability has been stalled. The Finance Ministry has 
disapproved the IB’s request for computer trained personnel to develop and maintain 
the MAC. Funding for the JTFIs and associated training has also been cut. This 
bureaucratic confrontation is attributable to the long standing infighting between the 
Indian Administrative Service officers who dominate the Home ministry and the Indian 
Police Service officers who constitute the majority of the IB.80 The inability the Indian 
government to institute meaningful intelligence reforms, establish clear organizational 
mission roles and responsibilities, and manage the competitive tensions between 
different bureaucracies are of critical importance given the similarities of the U.S. 
intelligence community and its efforts to reform itself, institute organizational change, 
and establish a strategic approach to combating terrorism in a post 9/11 environment. 
Strategic Outlook. India has faced many internal security problems since 
establishing its independence in 1947. Consisting of a multitude of ethnicities, 
languages, and particularly due to the partition of India and Pakistan, India has faced 
numerous acts of sectarian violence. In 1999, the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight 814 
prompted calls for stronger anti-terrorism legislation. The subsequent events of 9/11 
affected the Indian government’s perception of the al Qaeda threat and provided an 
opportunity for parliamentarians to enact stronger legislation that addressed 
transnational terrorism and financing issues.81 In 2002, the legislature, led by the 
nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, passed The Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) – a 
strong anti-terror legislation similar to the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Australia.82 The legislation came under severe criticism and was later repealed in 2004 
with the entrance of a new government under the opposing Congress party.83 The July 
2006 terrorist attacks in Mumbai have renewed the demands for more stringent anti-
terrorism legislation. 
Although the Indian government has recognized the threat posed by al Qaeda 
through its proximity to the Indian subcontinent, the government has been unable to 
articulate precisely its approach to combating terrorism. A key shortfall in the POTA 
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legislation was that it lacked any linkage to a wider counterterrorism strategy and 
approach. As Swati Pandey states: 
For a counterterrorism law, lawmakers should consider the state’s police capabilities, 
the legal system, and the political leanings of its population to make sure that the law 
will be successful. If these means are sufficient, then the goals of the law can be 
reached.84 
The absence of political buy-in, unclear linkages between the legislation’s intent and 
the actual capabilities of security forces, and poor existing oversight mechanisms result 
in a mismatch between the strategic vision versus actual practice. The Indian 
government’s approach has been erratic with limited consensus between political 
parties. These inconsistencies stem from India’s longer-term inadequacy in managing 
national security. As B. Raman asserts, this is due to three factors: 
The absence of long-term thinking and planning are due to preoccupation with 
day-to-day crisis management and short-term compulsions, the inhibition of 
fresh thinking and a coordinated approach to national security issues due to the 
undue influence of narrow departmental mindsets, and the absence of a 
watchdog set-up, uninfluenced by departmental loyalties, to monitor the 
implementation of the national security decisions and remove bottlenecks.85  
Given this framework and unlike MI5 and ASIO, the role of the IB is less clear. The IB 
clearly has many domestic intelligence functions. Conversely, unclear strategic 
guidance, obscured responsibilities, bureaucratic infighting, and extremely limited 
oversight mechanisms severely hamper its ability to execute its mission. The Indian 
shortfalls of translating strategic intent into coherent intelligence reform and 
community management is of paramount – indeed critical - importance for the United 
States as it attempts to redefine its intelligence apparatus in a post 9/11 environment. 
Information Sharing. The challenges faced by the IB are also a reflection of the 
Indian national security apparatus. The Saxena Committee recommended the 
implementation of an Intelligence Coordination Group (ICG) and Technology 
Coordination Group (TCG) to work closely with the National Security Council 
Secretariat (NSCS) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).86 These groups were 
intended to focus on resource allocation, annual reviews, national estimates, and 
executive oversight.87  
Bureaucratic infighting has also plagued the information sharing and assessment 
process. The National Security Council (NSC), revived as part of the committee’s 
recommendations, has been ineffective in orchestrating the various agencies towards a 
single purpose.88 The NSC is rarely convened and does not have a dedicated staff 
structure to support this process.89 Senior officials also state that there is little to no 
coordination between the IB, RAW, and the newly formed Defence Intelligence Agency 
(DIA).90 
Although India’s organizational structures are similar to the United Kingdom and 
Australia, they are not as developed or resourced. Bureaucratic infighting and the lack 
of strong executive direction have limited the IB’s effectiveness. There is also an 
inherent instability in India’s organizational approaches and processes to managing 
national security and intelligence functions.91 Despite its responsibility for domestic 
intelligence, the IB has not been given the requisite tools to perform varied 
responsibilities. As Praveen Swami, an Indian journalist noted for his coverage of 
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Indian national security issues commented, “The head of the U.S.’ Federal Bureau of 
Investigation can authorize the cash down purchase of millions of dollars of equipment, 
while the Director of India’s Intelligence Bureau cannot authorize the purchase of a 
new desktop computer for his secretary.”92 
Oversight. The Saxena Committee also attempted to address oversight issues by 
defining India’s different intelligence agency’s missions and roles and to ensure 
executive oversight via the NSCS.93 The inability to implement these reforms, 
particularly at the executive and assessment level, has resulted in little progress. 
Additionally, abuse of the Official Secrets Act of 1923 prohibits national security issues 
from coming into the forefront of public debate.94 As Sarath Ramkumar notes, “Top-
level political appointees quickly become vigilant in seeking to preserve three main 
bureaucratic prerogatives of secrecy: control over preservation, control over custody 
and control over access.”95 
In the absence of a wider public debate, India’s parliamentary members rarely 
discuss or understand the wider implications of India’s intelligence issues.96 In fact, the 
IB and the RAW are not formally accountable to the parliament.97 The lack of an 
effective oversight structure leads to India’s legislature being removed from the 
process. The Standing Committee on Home Affairs has received briefings on the IB’s 
activities, but few of its members have a background in intelligence or are sufficiently 
staffed to exercise effective oversight.98 Ramkumar offers the following insightful 
assessment of India’s intelligence community: 
Intelligence agencies are not islands that exist outside executive control. The 
usefulness and the quality of intelligence is only as good as the government of 
the day requires. Any serious reforms in the field of intelligence need an 
understanding of the precise role of intelligence agencies in serving the nation’s 
national security interest.99 
The lack of executive and legislative oversight mechanisms has resulted in the 
politicization of the IB. Most of the bureau’s focus has been on political surveillance 
and election-related information gathering in support of the ruling party.100 As one 
member of the National Security Advisory Board commented recently, “How can we 
expect the IB to function if a large part of its resources is directed at serving the ruling 
political party of the day?”101 
Although the United Kingdom and Australia have suffered from oversight shortfalls, 
the Indian shortcomings in this area have hampered greater intelligence reforms. 
Understanding the linkage between implementing reform and oversight, given the 
challenge faced by the Indian government, is of unique importance for the United 
States. Improving the effectiveness of intelligence oversight – an identified 9/11 
recommendation – serves to link the intent and vision of national strategy to the 
implementation of intelligence reforms.102 
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Figure 3. DCAF Benchmarks versus the U.K.-Australia-India 
 
Conclusion. The IB has not been given the necessary tools and resources to fulfill its 
mission. Although the IB has a long history of performing its internal security function, 
the majority of its focus has been on political surveillance. Despite sound 
recommendations and higher-level organizational initiatives, bureaucratic infighting 
and petty competition have inhibited translating these initiatives into meaningful 
activities. Lastly, despite possessing definitive intelligence organizations and mandated 
assessment entities, the lack of strong executive direction and bipartisanship, weak 
legislative oversight, organizational instability, and ineffective resourcing have resulted 
in a listless national security and intelligence apparatus. These limitations, when 
compared to the DCAF benchmarks in Figure 3, display a marginal effectiveness. 
India’s intelligence apparatus does not operate under a well defined set of laws and 
coordination between intelligence agencies remains an endemic problem. Its 
independent assessment capability has not been properly resourced and bureaucratic 
infighting greatly inhibits the ability of the executive to coordinate and direct 
intelligence efforts. Lastly, India’s almost total lack of executive and legislative 
oversight severely limits accountability and the ability to reform the system. 
 
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: APPLICATION FOR THE UNITED 
STATES? 
Proponents of a domestic intelligence agency highlight the importance of prevention, 
yet domestic intelligence agencies focused solely on information gathering and 
developing sources have not been proven to be more effective in preventing terrorist 
attacks. They may have a greater ability to develop better and more precise intelligence 
assessments on the nature of the domestic threat. The bombings in London (2005) and 
Mumbai (2006), however, highlight the point that not all attacks can be prevented. 
Additionally, the metrics for how many attacks have been prevented and where these 
agencies can cite unreported successes is absent due to their classified nature. By 
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examining the United Kingdom, Australia, and India, it is evident that the challenges of 
coordinating intelligence, sharing information, and implementing oversight 
mechanisms are problematic and relevant issues for their domestic intelligence 
agencies. 
Organization. For the United States, intelligence coordination and assessment were 
highlighted as significant shortfalls after 9/11. Although the United States does not 
have an assessment apparatus as highly centralized and evolved as the United Kingdom 
or Australia, it has been recognized as a shortfall and steps have been taken to address 
this issue. The major change was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security 
with an intelligence charter. The U.S. government also adopted measures to implement 
intelligence coordination and improve identified shortfalls through the creation of the 
Director for National Intelligence (DNI), the National Counter Terrorism Center 
(NCTC), and revamping the FBI’s intelligence capability.103 Calls for further FBI 
reforms have continued. As a result of further findings, the FBI consolidated many of 
its intelligence functions under the creation of the National Security Service.104 Despite 
the creation of these new agencies and initiatives, the effectiveness of these 
organizations to implement and institutionalize intelligence reforms, manage 
resources, and develop strategic assessments as envisioned in the national strategy is 
questionable, particularly since these initiatives have occurred within a relatively short 
period of nearly six years after 9/11 and given similar Indian attempts over the last 
decade. 
Information Sharing. As with the United Kingdom, Australia, and India, 
information sharing is a significant issue for the United States. This is recognized as a 
core issue in the National Intelligence Strategy for the United States.105 Further 
measures have been taken to address this issue through creating the NCTC, instituting 
the DHS, reforming the FBI’s headquarters, implementing Field Intelligence Groups 
(FIGs), and developing state intelligence fusion centers. The domestic intelligence 
challenge in the United States is similar to India’s in terms of organization and the 
scope of the problem. Despite higher level initiatives, the FBI continues to have a “law 
enforcement” mindset, is experiencing similar problems with implementing its 
information sharing technology, and is faced with coordinating with multiple state and 
local efforts.106 The DHS has also been faced with similar bureaucratic hurdles. 
Additionally, there is no clear linkage or relationship between the NCTC and the 
numerous state and local fusion centers that have been created since 9/11.107 As a 
result, the level of integration remains questionable. Despite the plethora of executive 
findings and directives, there are still significant bureaucratic hurdles and infighting to 
sharing information. 
Oversight. Intelligence oversight remains an issue for the United States. 
Controversies such as the National Security Agency’s (NSA) electronic surveillance and 
the Department of Defense’s Counter Intelligence Field Activity’s (CIFA) monitoring of 
U.S. persons, the intelligence activities in Guantánamo, and the handling of National 
Security Letters remain at the forefront of the political debate. Intelligence initiatives 
have been undertaken since 9/11, but most of these efforts – particularly with regard to 
domestic intelligence – have received significant criticism due to ineffective 
implementation efforts and a lack of bipartisan buy-in. While oversight issues are also 
challenges for MI5, ASIO, and the IB, Australia seems to have a highly developed, 
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resourced, and aggressive executive and legislative oversight component. A closer 
examination of Australia’s oversight practices and mechanisms could yield practical 
lessons for the United States. Additionally, the United States needs to streamline and 
improve its legislative oversight process – a key recommendation of the 9/11 
Commission – to ensure proper safeguards for civil liberties and accountability of 





Figure 4. DCAF Benchmarks versus U.K.-Australia-India-U.S. 
 
Conclusion. When compared to the DCAF benchmarks in Figure 4, the United States 
possesses a well defined set of laws operating under a strong executive mechanism. 
These strengths, however, are offset by a weaker executive and legislative oversight 
process. Although U.S. oversight mechanisms limit the statutory ability of the FBI and 
other agencies to conduct domestic intelligence, there are still oversight shortfalls in 
terms of staffing, resources, and legislative access. As seen in the Indian case, limited 
oversight can also lead to poor implementation of intelligence initiatives. Although 
there have been numerous fact-finding commissions, such as the 9/11, the Commission 
on Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, and the numerous panels prior to 9/11, there has not been a strategic and 
bipartisan approach to overseeing and tracking the implementation and effectiveness of 
these reforms. Lastly, although steps have been taken to institutionalize the NCTC’s 
independent assessment capability and fuse domestic and foreign intelligence, it is 
uncertain whether these steps are translating into positive action, whether they are 
truly combining with the efforts of the DHS or regional, state, or large metropolitan 
fusion centers, or whether an additional layer of bureaucracy has been added to an 
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Although domestic intelligence agencies possess several shortfalls in not being able to 
prevent terrorist attacks and have corresponding information-sharing shortfalls and 
oversight issues, these shortfalls do not address the entire scope of the problem. While 
domestic intelligence agencies may not be able to prevent all terrorist attacks, are they 
more successful in preventing most attacks? Do effective domestic intelligence 
agencies, solely focused on intelligence gathering and unencumbered by law 
enforcement responsibilities, possess a better ability to focus and develop precise 
intelligence? Without access to classified sources or performance measures, most 
literature would suggest that domestic intelligence agencies are more effective in 
developing intelligence through the penetration of terrorist cells and collation of other 
intelligence data.109 
Additionally, the combination of law enforcement and intelligence functions under 
the FBI and the Attorney General, acting as the federal government’s chief legal officer, 
has also led to civil rights abuses. Opponents to the creation of a domestic intelligence 
agency fail to recognize that the argument for separating domestic intelligence from 
law enforcement functions was precisely the reason for limiting the West German 
government’s ability to exercise arbitrary power when it was reconstituted as a nation 
in the 1950s.110 In other words, the German domestic intelligence apparatus was 
consciously separated from law enforcement responsibilities to prevent an abuse of 
power. Balancing civil rights and public safety remains a problematic issue for 
democracies whether they possess a domestic intelligence agency or not. 
Despite the arguments posed by the advocates for and opponents to having a 
domestic intelligence agency for the United States, an examination of MI5, ASIO, and 
the IB have shown that domestic intelligence agencies are not necessarily the solution 
to addressing the domestic intelligence gap. They may possess a greater ability to better 
categorize threats and operate unencumbered by complicated and competing mission 
roles within one agency. In terms of the feasibility, suitability, and acceptability of 
implementing this organizational construct for the United States, it is feasible to 
develop a U.S. domestic intelligence agency if the resources and executive direction are 
applied to instituting this capability. The critical feasibility issue, however, is whether 
the United States can translate strategic guidance and direction into meaningful 
change, reform, and capability that mitigates the domestic intelligence gap – whether 
under a domestic intelligence agency or some other organizational construct. This is 
the clear lesson from India’s attempt to reform the IB and institute larger intelligence 
reforms. 
Suitability (whether the mission will be accomplished if the tasks are carried out 
successfully) is also contingent on the ability to translate strategic intent into 
meaningful change. The 9/11 Commission did not see a need to create a domestic 
intelligence agency unless their other recommendations were not adopted – to create 
an effective NCTC and Director of National Intelligence (DNI).111 The effectiveness of 
the DNI to implement reform was questionable when 96 percent of the FBI’s 
intelligence function fell outside of the DNI’s purview.112 Continued FBI reform 
attempts, as evidenced by reorganization efforts in 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001, are 
indicative of organizational instability or resistance to change.113 Organizational 
instability and resistance to change can also be applied to NSA. Additionally, the 
BURCH, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOL. III, NO. 2 (JUNE 2007) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
19 
 
obstacles to creating a unified DHS are another indication of bureaucratic 
intransigence. The implementation of a strategic vision into reality is clearly a 
challenge that India has had to face. These shortfalls and others would indicate that 
current tasks and reforms are not being effectively implemented. 
Like the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and India have been unable 
to prevent terrorist attacks. In the absence of definitively demonstrating that domestic 
intelligence agencies are better positioned to prevent most attacks, the single largest 
obstacle to implementing this organizational construct in the United States is cultural. 
Given the history and structure of the United States, it is probably still not acceptable 
to have a domestic intelligence agency. Although the political supportability was 
stronger after 9/11, most Americans do not like to feel that they are being spied upon by 
their government or neighbors.114 Additionally, as Kate Martin points out, “Nothing in 
the pre-September 11 law prevented the CIA from informing the FBI that the suspected 
terrorists had entered the United States, and nothing would have prevented the FBI 
from pursuing them.”115 The issue lies in the practical interpretation of these 
regulations. It was the inability to effectively put these regulations into practice that led 
to information-sharing shortfalls prior to 9/11. It is also the inability to effectively 
implement the post 9/11 regulations and intelligence initiatives through a bipartisan 
approach – such as the NSA monitoring program – that creates continued foreign-
domestic information sharing gaps. 
The central issue is not whether to have a combined law enforcement and 
intelligence organization versus a sole domestic intelligence agency. The issue is 
effective organizational reform, information sharing, and oversight.116 Effective 
organizational change, information sharing, and oversight are not necessarily achieved 
through high-level organizational repositioning, implementing common information 
data systems, or passing new regulations for managing intelligence operations and 
reform. The absence of a significant terrorist attack in the United States since 9/11 is 
also not a good indicator that the intelligence apparatus is operating more efficiently. 
The creation of additional bureaucracies, an increased centralization of intelligence 
functions that inhibits the analysis of opposing alternatives, and the inability of the 
U.S. Congress to reform its oversight process may have actually led to greater 
drawbacks rather than progress. Although the United States has developed strategies 
and applied significant resources to address its weaker areas – such as the creation of 
the DNI to oversee the intelligence community, the NCTC to integrate domestic-foreign 
intelligence and develop assessments, and the professionalization of the DHS and the 
FBI’s intelligence functions – there remains a level of uncertainty whether these 
initiatives have resulted in greater progress and meaningful transformation. This 
uncertainty continues to place the United States at risk. To address these information 
sharing and oversight uncertainties, the following actions are recommended: 
• Assess the ability of the DNI to exercise leadership and management over the 
intelligence community in terms of controlling resources, implementing cross-
organizational information sharing initiatives, and effecting reform consistent 
with the National Intelligence Strategy for the United States. This is a clear 
lesson learned from similar Indian attempts to reform its intelligence 
community since the 1999 GoM findings. 
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• Capitalizing on the British and Australian strengths in developing strategic 
assessments and categorizing domestic threats, conduct an end-to-end 
organizational review of NCTC to analyze its performance compared to its stated 
mission, particularly its ability to support its domestic intelligence assessment 
within a national and not strictly federal context. 
• Given the identified information-sharing shortfalls with countries possessing 
domestic intelligence agencies, conduct a review of information sharing and 
knowledge management policies to assess the applicability of current policies 
versus actual practice, most notably providing warning and the sharing of raw 
and unevaluated intelligence between organizations.117 
• Review the FBI’s and DHS’s intelligence reform initiatives in terms of 
professionalization, information sharing, strategic focus, and resource 
allocation to determine if there is a continued law enforcement versus 
intelligence mindset, as evidenced by Indian bureaucratic infighting. 
• Drawing from Australian strengths, reevaluate executive and congressional 
oversight mechanisms and reforms to identify duplicative functions, staffing, 
resources, and the ability to link strategic intent to implementation of 
intelligence reforms. 
 
Merely implementing a U.S. domestic intelligence agency will not prevent further 
terrorist attacks. Although the domestic intelligence agencies of the United Kingdom, 
Australia, and to a lesser extent, India, have had their successes, they have also suffered 
the same shortcomings of the United States in terms of information sharing and 
oversight. Additionally, there have been numerous organizational changes and 
attempts at reform since 9/11. Only an in-depth appraisal of the DNI and NCTC’s 
performance, the ability of intelligence and law enforcement organizations to share 
information, the FBI’s progress at reforming itself, the implementation of the DHS as 
an organization with a domestic intelligence function, and the ability to provide 
effective oversight will determine whether the intelligence shortfalls identified in the 
congressional inquiry into the attacks on 9/11 have been addressed.118 
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